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COMMENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-
Prejudgment Seizure of Property
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974)
INTRODUCTION
Lawrence Mitchell purchased a refrigerator, range, stereo,
and washing machine from W. T. Grant Company under an in-
stallment sales contract which, by state law,' provided Grant
with a vendor's lien to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase
price. Because of a delinquency in payments by Mitchell and
based on its lien, Grant filed suit to recover the unpaid purchase
price. In addition to the suit, Grant applied to the court under
the Louisiana sequestration statute2 for a writ authorizing the
He who has sold to another any movable property, which is not paid
for, has a preference on the price of his property, over the other creditors of
the purchaser, whether the sale was made on a credit or without, if the
property still remains in the possession of the purchaser.
So that although the vendor may have taken a note, bond or other
acknowledgement from the buyer, he still enjoys the privilege.
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952).
By operation of the law of Louisiana, title may pass to the purchaser, but the vendor
retains preference on the purchase price over other creditors. Wallace Lincoln-Mercury
Co. v. Gentry, 469 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1972). The vendor's privilege is referred to as a
"statutory lien" on the property. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620, aff'd per curiam, 402
F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
The important sections of the Louisiana statute are:
A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only when the nature
of the claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied upon for
the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts shown by the
petition verified by, or by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his counsel
or agent.
The applicant shall furnish security as required by law for the payment
of the damages the defendant may sustain when the writ is obtained wrong-
fully.
LA. CODE CIv. PRo. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
The defendant by contradictory motion may obtain the dissolution of a
writ of attachment or of sequestration, unless the plaintiff proves the grounds
upon which the writ was issued. If the writ of attachment or of sequestration
is dissolved, the action shall then proceed as if no writ had been issued.
The court may allow damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of
attachment or of sequestration on a motion to dissolve, or on a reconven-
tional demand. Attorney's fees for the services rendered in connection with
the dissolution of the writ may be included as an element of damages
whether the writ is dissolved on motion or after trial on the merits.
Id. art. 3506.
A defendant may obtain the release of the property seized under a writ
of attachment or of sequestration by furnishing security for the satisfaction
of any judgment which may be rendered against him.
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seizure of the household goods pending the litigation. In support
of its application for the writ, Grant's credit manager swore in an
affidavit that the seller had reason to believe that the buyer
would "encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchan-
dise described in the foregoing petition during the pendency of
these proceedings, and that a writ of sequestration is necessary
in the premises." 3 Based on this ex parte application by the credi-
tor, and without notice to the buyer or hearing before seizure of
the property, the judge authorized issuance of a writ of sequestra-
tion. A surety bond was filed by the creditor, and Mitchell's goods
were seized.
Mitchell challenged the seizure by motion, arguing that his
rights to due process under the fourteenth amendment had been
violated by a seizure of his property without prior notice or a
hearing. Mitchell's motion to dissolve the writ was denied by the
state court, and this action was affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.4
Only 2 years prior to Mitchell, in Fuentes v. Shevin,5 the
Supreme Court found the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin stat-
utes' unconstitutional as a denial of due process because the stat-
Id. art. 3507.
The security for the release of property seized under a writ of attachment
or of sequestration shall exceed by one-fourth the value of the property as
determined by the court, or shall exceed by one-fourth the amount of the
claim, whichever is the lesser.
Id. art. 3508.
When one claims the ownership or right to possession of property, or a
mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may have the property seized under
a writ of sequestration, if it is within the power of the defendant to conceal,
dispose of, or waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the
property from the parish, during the pendency of the action.
Id. art. 3571.
An applicant for a writ of sequestration shall furnish security for an
amount determined by the court to be sufficient to protect the defendant
against any damage resulting from a wrongful issuance, unless security is
dispensed with by law.
Id. art. 3574.
If the defendant does not effect the release of property seized under a
writ of sequestration, as permitted by Article 3507, within ten days of the
seizure, the plaintiff may effect the release thereof by furnishing the security
required by Article 3508.
Id. art. 3576.
1 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 602 (1974).
4 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
1 Sequestration, replevin, and attachment are prejudgment remedies. A writ of se-
questration issued by the court allows property which is in the possession of the defendant
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utes allowed prejudgment seizure of property without prior notice
or a hearing.
This comment examines case law interpretations of Fuentes
to show that courts acknowledged that the case required notice
and a hearing prior to seizure. Analysis of the Mitchell opinion
reveals that exceptions to the due process requirement of notice
and a hearing were used to support the Mitchell holding; that a
new right, that of the interest of the creditor under the fourteenth
amendment, was created; and that the statutes at issue in
Mitchell and Fuentes are so procedurally similar as to be indistin-
guishable. Thus, it appears that the Court in Mitchell overruled
the due process requirements of Fuentes. Consequently, it is nec-
essary to discuss what statutory procedures will be upheld under
Mitchell.
I. Fuentes v. Shevin: ITS INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
A. The Fuentes Line of Cases
Until 1969 courts upheld the constitutionality of prejudg-
ment provisional remedies which provided for the seizure of prop-
erty without prior notice and a hearing.7 In 1969, however, in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp." the Supreme Court reversed
the trend. The Court held that a prejudgment garnishment proce-
dure by which an employee's wages could be withheld before trial
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as
a taking or property without prior notice or a hearing.' After
Sniadach the Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly 0 that the
due process clause required prior notice and a hearing before the
state could terminate welfare payments. Next, in Bell v. Burson,I I
to be taken by the sheriff and held by the court pending outcome of the suit. Replevin is
an action to recover possession of goods unlawfully taken and entails a redelivery to the
owner. Attachment involves taking defendant's property into legal custody as security for
a judgment against the defendant. Attachment, unlike replevin, involves no claim of
ownership on the property seized. Louisiana statutes provide only for the prejudgment
remedies of attachment and sequestration. However, in Louisiana, sequestration involves
a claim of ownership or possession of the property seized and is very similar to replevin
statutes of other states.
' Johnson v. Chicago & Pac. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); Robinson v. Loyola
Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1970); Shell Oil Co. v. Milne, 127 Vt. 249, 246 A.2d
837 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965, 396 U.S. 916 (1969); McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me.
110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Id. at 342.
I0 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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the Court held that the due process clause required a hearing
before the state could deprive an uninsured motorist of his
driver's license. A significant trend appeared to be developing,
and the courts began to proscribe the more severe creditors' reme-
dies. 2
Then, in 1972 the Supreme Court in Fuentes found the Flor-
ida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes unconstitutional as a de-
nial of due process because the statutes allowed prejudgment
seizure of property without prior notice or a hearing. Because lack
of a hearing and prior notice could cause unfair, arbitrary, or
mistaken deprivation of the use or possession of property," this
procedural deficiency was a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The statutes in Fuentes, like the statute in Mitchell, re-
quired a hearing before final deprivation of property 4 and the
posting of a bond by the creditor before the writ was issued." Yet,
while these provisions were adjudged insufficient to adequately
protect the debtor under the fourteenth amendment in Fuentes,
they were upheld in Mitchell. Moreover, in Fuentes, retention of
the title by the vendor" or probable success at trial did not affect
the basic right to a prior hearing before seizure of the property
from the debtor.
Fuentes recognized "extraordinary situation" exceptions
where certain governmental or public interests outweigh the re-
quirement of prior notice and a hearing before prejudgment dep-
rivation of property. 8 For example, in order to collect revenue,
the state has been permitted to seize its citizen's property without
prior notice or a hearing. 9 Additionally, in order to protect the
public health, 0 to meet the needs of a national war effort,2' to
2 See Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Ran-
done v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn.
205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970). But see Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100
(D. Conn. 1971); Reeves v. Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Termplan, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68 (1969).
" 407 U.S. at 81-82.
1, Id. at 82-83.
" Id. at 83.
6 Id. at 86.
17 Id.
11 407 U.S. at 90-92. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306
(1908); Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1954).
" Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1954).
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); North Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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protect the public from bank failure,2" and to secure jurisdiction
in court, 3 the state is allowed a post-seizure adjudication. The
Court in Fuentes, however, held that because the replevin stat-
utes at issue served only private interests, not a compelling gov-
ernmental or public interest which would allow post-seizure adju-
dication,"' a hearing was required prior to seizure.
As a result of Fuentes, courts struck down prejudgment pro-
visional remedies which did not provide for prior notice and a
hearing before deprivation of property. 5 Further, of the 34 states
that had statutes similar to the replevin statutes held unconstitu-
tional in Fuentes, 15 have repealed or amended their statutes
since the case was decided. Moreover, courts interpreted the due
process requirements of Fuentes very broadly, and applied them
to situations unrelated to a creditor-debtor relationship.
2 7
21 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944).
2 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S.
29 (1928).
3 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Steele v. G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339
(5th Cir. 1973); Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1973); United States
Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Del. 1972); Standard Oil Co. v. Superior Ct.,
44 Del. 538, 62 A.2d 454, appeal dismissed, 336 U.S. 930 (1949).
21 407 U.S. at 92.
1 Western Coach Corp. v. Shreve, 475 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1973) (garnishment); Turner
v. Colonial Fin. Corp., 467 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1972) (replevin); Hammond v. Powell, 462
F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972) (claim and delivery); Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breed-
ing Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973) (attachment); In re
Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (attachment);
Yates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 362 F. Supp. 520 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (detinue); Gunter v.
Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973) (attachment); Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973) (attachment and garnishment);
Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973) (attachment); Trapper
Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1973) (attachment);
Mitchell v. Tennessee, 351 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Tenn. 1972) (replevin); McClellan v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1013 (D.R.I. 1972) (attachment); Schneider v.
Margossian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972) (attachment); Miloszewski v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 346 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Mich. 1972) (search and seizure of personal property);
Sena v. Montoya, 346 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1972) (replevin).
"S The states which repealed or amended their statutes are: Colo., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill.,
Iowa, Kan., Mich., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.D., Okla., S.D., Tenn., and Wyo.
7 For cases which require broad due process procedures in employee discharge pro-
ceedings, see McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973); Silar v. Smith, 361 F. Supp.
1187 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 358 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973); Pennsylvania ex rel.
Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Kennedy
v. Sanchez, 349 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
For cases which require broad due process procedures in search and seizure proceed-
ings, see Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494
(D.N.J. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 506 F.2d 395 (3d Cir. 1974); Fell v. Armour, 355 F.
Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
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B. Cases Interpreting Fuentes
The reasoning of Fuentes was subsequently applied to deter-
mine the constitutionality of attachment statutes."8 It is indica-
tive of the broad interpretation given to Fuentes that attachment
statutes which did not deprive owners of actual possession of their
property29 were found unconstitutional.3 0 For example, in Gunter
v. Merchants Warren National Bank3l a statute allowing attach-
ment of real estate was found unconstitutional. The court in
Gunter held that while a real estate attachment does not disturb
possession, it creates a lien on the property and deprives the
owner of his ability to convey a clear title-a significant property
interest. Thus, according to interpretations of Fuentes,32 property
which cannot be deprived without notice and a hearing includes
both possessory and non-possessory interests.
33
Fuentes was also applied to determine the constitutionality
of materialmen's and mechanics' liens.34 In Mason v. Garris31 a
Georgia statute was challenged which allowed a mechanic, who
had worked on a vehicle and had not been paid, to foreclose by
levy and sale of the vehicle without notice or a hearing. The
statute was held unconstitutional, and the rights of one with a
security interest similar to the one held by Grant in Mitchell were
" Unlike sequestration and replevin statutes which provide for seizure of property by
one with an interest in the property, attachment statutes allow seizure of property in
which the creditor has no prior interest.
" Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 725
(W.D. Wash. 1973); Higley Hill, Inc. v. Knight, 360 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1973); Gunter
v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973); Schneider v. Margos-
sian, 349 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1972).
3 In addition to attachment and replevin, other summary creditors' remedies were
struck down, including, for instance, landlord lien statutes which allow the landlord in
the event of a rent default to seize the property of the tenant without prior notice or
hearing. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Macqueen v. Lambert,
348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va.
1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972).
31 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973).
' Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp.,
360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973); Trapper Brown Constr. Co. v. Electromech, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 105 (D.N.H. 1973); McClellan v. Commercial Credit Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1013
(D.R.I. 1972); Miloszewski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 346 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Mich. 1972).
See cases cited note 29 supra.
Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973); Mason v.
Garis, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp.
902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
3 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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discussed in light of Fuentes: "It is the vehicle owner-not the
mechanic-who, under the current statutes, is deprived of the use
of his vehicle without the protections of procedural due process.
The mechanic's interest is only a security interest. ' 3 In cases
dealing with creditors' rights, "deprivation" has always referred
to the use and possession by the debtor, never to the security
interest of the creditor, and post-Fuentes cases consistently so
hold. 7 The cases that upheld lien statutes after Fuentes did not
involve the execution of the lien. In these cases the courts rea-
soned that no dispossession of property had occurred 8 or that the
deprivation was de minimus.39 However, even these cases recog-
nized that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, prior
notice and hearing were required before any significant depriva-
tion of property.
Thus, case law interpretation has held Fuentes to require
some form of notice and a hearing prior to the deprivation of the
use or possession of property, with the exception of an extraordi-
nary governmental or public interest. Clearly, the holding in
Mitchell that Fuentes required a hearing only before final depri-
vation of property4 is inconsistent with case law analysis of
Fuentes.
II. THE EFFECT OF Mitchell
A. Rationale of the Majority Opinion
As support for its argument that post-seizure adjudication
satisfies the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court cites cases widely recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of prior notice and hearing.4 Further, the Court in
Mitchell creates a right of the creditor heretofore unrecognized
under the fourteenth amendment which is "measured by the un-
paid balance of the purchase price."4 Finally, the Court distin-
' Id. at 424.
2 See cases cited note 25 supra.
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hansons, Inc., Civil No. 72-417PHXWEC (D. Ariz. Sept.
12, 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
" Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973).
, 416 U.S. at 611.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Phillips v. Commis-
sioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per
curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929); Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611
(1905); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
,1 416 U.S. at 604. See text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
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guishes the statutes at issue in Mitchell and Fuentes on a proce-
dural basis. However, the replevin statutes in Fuentes and the
sequestration statute in Mitchell are so similar as to be indistin-
guishable. Therefore, the Court in Mitchell has, in essence, over-
ruled Fuentes and has effected a change in present day require-
ments of prejudgment due process.
1. Exceptions to the Requirement of Notice and Hearing
Used as Support for the Mitchell Holding
The Court in Mitchell states that Sniadach and Fuentes
stand for the proposition that "a hearing must be had before one
is finally deprived of his property and [they] do not deal at all
with the need for a pretermination hearing where a full and im-
mediate post-termination hearing is provided. ,4 3 To substantiate
this position, the Mitchell opinion cites three cases: Phillips v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue," Scottish Union & National
Insurance Co. v. Bowland,15 and Springer v. United States." Each
case involves the enforcement of a tax lien by summary proceed-
ings with subsequent opportunity for the determination of legal
rights. As noted above,47 the collection by the government of its
revenue has consistently been recognized as an exceptional situa-
tion of compelling state interest allowing post-seizure
adjudication." Fuentes" and cases subsequent 0 have also recog-
nized this exception.
The majority in Mitchell relies most heavily on Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.5" to substantiate its argument that
case law merely requires "a full and immediate post-termination
hearing. ' 2 Ewing involved a prehearing seizure of articles in
order to protect the public from misbranded goods. Again the
Court cites an acknowledged exception-protection of public
health 3-to support its proposition that only post-seizure adjudi-
416 U.S. at 611.
1, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
45 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
44 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
11 See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
" Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1954).
4' 407 U.S. at 92 n.24.
Commonwealth Dev. Ass'n v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 792, 795 (M.D. Pa. 1973);
Catoor v. Blair, 358 F. Supp. 815, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Parrish v. Daly, 350 F. Supp..735,
737 (S.D. Ind. 1972).
' 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
52 416 U.S. at 611.
5 See cases cited note 20 supra.
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cation is required. Situations of compelling public interest were
noted as exceptions in Fuentes4 and cannot be analogized to a
creditor-debtor situation as done by the Court in Mitchell.
Finally, the Supreme Court notes its unanimous approval in
Coffin Brothers v. Bennett,55 Ownbey v. Morgan," and McInnes
v. McKay57 of prejudgment attachment liens effected without
notice or hearing. Coffin challenged a Georgia statute which gave
the state power to issue an attachment which acted as a lien on
the property of shareholders of a defunct bank. Protecting the
public from the consequences of bank failure is a public interest
exception recognized as allowing seizure without notice or a hear-
ing5" and is not analogous to a creditor-debtor situation.
Ownbey upheld a foreign attachment law which provided a
basis for jurisdiction in a state court. By obtaining quasi in rem
jurisdiction a creditor may subject the tangible property of the
debtor to the payment of a debt even though he is unable to
secure in personam jurisdiction over the debtor. Historically, at-
tachments to secure jurisdiction in a state court have been up-
held" and are a recognized public interest exception not requiring
prior notice and a hearing. The reliance on this exception pro-
vides no support for the Court's holding since the trial court had
personal jurisdiction over Mitchell.
In McKay the Maine Supreme Court upheld a prejudgment
attachment of the debtor's real estate and stock without prior
notice or a hearing. However, the statute in McKay differed from
the statute in Mitchell because it did not provide for prejudgment
seizure nor did it prevent the debtor from disposing of the prop-
erty prior to judgment. 0 The statute in McKay merely permitted
a lien to be placed upon the property, allowing the creditor to
seize and levy upon the property only in the event he was success-
ful in a later suit against the property owner.' The court upheld
the statute on the basis that the procedure did not constitute a
deprivation of property, stating, "[deprivation] takes place
when the free use and enjoyment of the thing or the power to
407 U.S. at 90-92.
s 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
256 U.S. 94 (1921).
', 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699, aff'd per curiam, 279 U.S. 820 (1929).
See cases cited note 22 supra.
, See cases cited note 23 supra.
:0 127 Me. at 114, 141 A. at 702.
*1 Id.
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dispose of it at will is affected.""2 The court upheld the statute
in McKay because there was no deprivation of property and did
not address the question of notice and hearing. Thus, the McKay
holding is not applicable to Mitchell where there was actual dis-
possession of property.
2. Balancing the Interests of Buyer and Seller
In Mitchell and Fuentes the debtors were deprived of identi-
cal property, household goods. In Fuentes the debtor's interest
protected by the fourteenth amendment was characterized as the
use and possession of this property. However, in Mitchell the
debtor's interest was characterized as "no greater than the sur-
plus remaining, if any, after foreclosure and sale of the prop-
erty."
3
The interests of the vendor-seller in the property of the vend-
ees in Mitchell and Fuentes were also similar. In Mitchell the
vendor retained a lien on the goods;" in Fuentes the vendor re-
tained the title to the merchandise. Under the fourteenth amend-
ment protected property includes vested rights,65 and a lien once
acquired has been held to be a vested property right." Addition-
ally, the possession of title has been held to allow recovery of a
property interest in an action of replevin. 7 Yet, the substantive
property right protected by the fourteenth amendment is the
right to retain the lien or title until the debt is paid. 8 There is
no case law holding, as the Court in Mitchell does, that the
creditor-vendor has a right in the property other than his title or
lien. However, the Court in Mitchell characterizes the interest of
02 Id. at 116, 141 A. at 702. The concept of "deprivation" under the fourteenth amend-
ment is the same in McKay and Fuentes. 407 U.S. at 86.
6 416 U.S. at 604.
" In Louisiana a conditional sales contract vests absolute title in the buyer, and a
vendor's lien is automatically created which secures the vendor for the unpaid puchase
price of the property so long as the property remains in the possession of the vendee.
Cristina Inv. Corp. v. Gulf Ice Co., 55 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
65 Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933); Grunbaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384
Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
" Bass v. Stodd, 357 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. One 1962 Ford Thun-
derbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964); White v. White, 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1961).
11 Brennan v. W.A. Wills, Ltd., 263 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1959); Harlan & Hollingsworth
Corp. v. McBride, 69 A.2d 9 (Del. 1949); Long v. Burnside, 295 111. App. 82, 14 N.E.2d
660 (1938); Berry v. Adams, 71 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); Hays v. Bashor, 108
Wash. 491, 185 P. 814 (1919).
" See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Security-
First Nat'l Bank v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 85 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 613 (1937); White v. White, 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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the creditor as "measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase
price.""5 This heretofore unrecognized property interest is ele-
vated to a protected right under the fourteenth amendment by
the Mitchell Court. The Fuentes line of cases 0 recognized only
the debtor's interest in the use and possession of his property as
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Clearly, the concept of
property interests protected by the fourteenth amendment ac-
cording to Fuentes has been expanded by Mitchell.
3. The Majority's Argument that Fuentes is Procedurally
Distinguished
The Court in Mitchell emphasizes the differences between
the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes which were struck
down in Fuentes and the Louisiana sequestration statute. Al-
though the names differ, the Louisiana sequestration and the
Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes permit the same
thing: prehearing seizure initiated by one who claims ownership
or right to possession. 1
The Supreme Court in Mitchell emphasizes that the writ in
Fuentes was issued on the mere "bare assertion of the party seek-
ing the writ that he is entitled to one,"'72 whereas, the Louisiana
statute requires "specific facts" showing the debt, lien, and delin-
quency.73 In reality, there is no true distinction between the stat-
utes. As noted by the Mitchell dissent,74 even though the Louis-
iana writ requires more information than that required by Penn-
sylvania and Florida, the application for the writ is still an ex
parte pro forma allegation on the part of the creditor acting in his
own interest. This is the same procedure that was struck down
in Fuentes, and therefore, the cases are indistinguishable on this
basis.
The Court in Mitchell75 emphasized that the bond require-
ments in the Louisiana statute are protective of the interests of
416 U.S. at 604.
7 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Snia-
dach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315
F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't of Sup. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536,
488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924 (1972); Jones Press, Inc.
v. Motor Travel Serv., Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970).
11 LA. CODE Ctv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961); PA. R. Civ. P. 1073 (1967); Act of
March 11, 1845, ch. 78, § 1, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
72 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74 (1972).
" LA. CODE CIv. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
7, 416 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 608.
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the debtor, but, in fact, a comparison of the statutes shows that
the bond requirements of the statutes struck down in Fuentes
were more protective of the debtor because they required a larger
bond from the creditor."6 The statutes at issue in Mitchell and
Fuentes also have provisions for counterbond, allowing the debtor
to effect the return of his property." Likewise, in this instance,
the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes required a larger counter-
bond from the debtor than the Louisiana statute, thus more ade-
quately protecting the creditor's interest. Therefore, the statutes
struck down in Fuentes provided greater protection for both the
creditor through the bond and the debtor through the counter-
bond than the statute upheld in Mitchell. Yet, the Court holds
that the bond requirement is adequate protection for the debtor,
thus overruling Fuentes which holds a bond no substitute for
prior hearing."
The Court in Mitchell approves of the fact that the writ of
sequestration is issued by a judge, not a court clerk as in
Fuentes." In essence, the procedure is indistinguishable because,
as noted by the Mitchell dissent, all either a judge or clerk does
based on this procedure is pass upon the "formal sufficiency" of
the pleadings. 0
Finally, the Court in Mitchell distinguishes Fuentes on the
basis that the Louisiana statute provides for an immediate hear-
ing, which was not required by the statutes in Fuentes.' First, the
hearing under the Louisiana statute is not automatic but may be
had only upon motion of the debtor. 2 Secondly, the Louisiana
statute does not set any time limits within which the debtor's
motion must be heard.83 Under Fuentes, any deprivation of prop-
erty would require a prior hearing. Matters such as bond, 4 length
11 Both statutes required a bond of at least double the value of the property. PA. R.
Civ. P. 1073 (1967); Act of March 11, 1845, ch. 78, § 7, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
7' LA. CODE CIV. PRo. ANN. art. 3508 (West 1961); PA. R. Crv. P. 1076 (1967); Act of
March 11, 1845, ch. 78 § 13, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
78 407 U.S. at 83.
" Outside the Orleans Parish a clerk issues the writ. However, the validity of issuance
in these areas is not at issue. 416 U.S. at 606-07.
s 416 U.S. at 629.
The Pennsylvania statute contained no time requirement for a hearing. However,
under the Florida statute the plaintiff was required to prosecute his action "without
delay." Act of March 11, 1845, ch. 78 § 7, Fla. Laws [1845] (repealed 1973).
82 LA. CODE CiV. PRO. ANN. art. 3506 (West 1961).
83 Id.
s, 407 U.S. at 83.
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and severity of deprivation,8 5 the necessity of the goods, 8 and
probable success at trial87 were specifically held not to affect the
right to a prior hearing. Clearly, then, the requirement of a prior
hearing has been overruled.
As a result of the Mitchell opinion, the due process require-
ments of Fuentes have been overruled and a new balancing of the
rights of the creditor and the debtor has been introduced. The
immediate question raised by Mitchell is what kind of prejudg-
ment provisional remedies will withstand a due process chal-
lenge.
HI. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACH TO Mitchell
Prejudgment seizures of property will predictably be upheld
under Mitchell if the statute requires: (1) an affidavit or verified
petition showing the debt, the security interest, and delin-
quency;88 (2) that the affidavit or verified petition be examined
by a court official, not a clerk, who will then authorize issuance
of the writ;89 (3) notice at the time of seizure;90 (4) a bond on the
part of the creditor in an amount that may be determined by the
court;9 (5) a counterbond payable within 10 days by the debtor
wishing to effect the return of his property exceeding by one-
fourth the value of the property or claim;"2 (6) a hearing which
Id. at 86.
Id. at 89.
" Id. at 87.
" In order to protect the debtor, the Court in Mitchell will not allow issuance of any
writ on demand, as allowed by the statutes in Fuentes. There must be a showing of
"specific facts" on the part of the creditor going beyond conclusory allegations.
11 The Court in Mitchell emphasized that the writ is not to be issued perfunctorily.
The Louisiana statute requires that before a writ is issued, cause must be shown to a judge,
not a clerk. Because of the problem of overcrowded dockets, a referee or hearing officer,
rather than a judge, would probably be permitted under Mitchell to pass on the adequacy
of the petition as long as there was sufficient scrutiny of the pleadings and as long as the
writ was not merely issued on request.
" Notice is received by the debtor at the time of seizure, and the debtor, according
to Mitchell, is protected by the right to an immediate hearing.
" The Florida and Pennsylvania statutes which were found unconstitutional in
Fuentes required a bond in an amount at least double the value of the property. However,
the Louisiana statute only requires "security as required by law," and in fact, Grant was
required to furnish a bond in the amount of $1,125, just less than twice the amount of the
alleged unpaid purchase price.
1 The statutes declared unconstitutional in Fuentes gave the debtor 3 days within
which to effect the return of his property by paying a bond in an amount double the value
of the property. The statute upheld in Mitchell provided that the debtor's bond shall
exceed by one-fourth the value of the property or the claim, whichever is the lesser. Under
Mitchell the debtor is allowed 10 days to file a counterbond before the creditor may effect
the release of the property.
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may be had upon motion of the debtor wherein the plaintiff must
prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued." It must be
emphasized that it is unclear whether the statutory provisions in
Mitchell comprise minimum due process requirements or
whether the lack of one or more of these elements render a statute
unconstitutional. Three cases decided since Mitchell illustrate
the inconsistent standards of due process which have resulted
from the Court's confusing treatment of Fuentes and inexact
statement of due process requirements. Furthermore, the situa-
tion is not clarified by the Supreme Court in the recent case of
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc."4
The first court to apply the Supreme Court ruling in Mitchell
was a three-judge district court in Ruocco v. Brinker." Under the
Florida mechanic's lien law, a lien was filed against the property
of homeowners for labor and materials. The court held that
Mitchell overruled the Fuentes requirement of a hearing prior to
deprivation of any significant property interest, stating that the
"once ominous spectre of the Sniadach-Fuentes doctrine has
faded into the past."9 The court viewed Mitchell as effectuating
" 'constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of
the parties.' "97 However, the court notes that it would have up-
held the statute under Fuentes because the deprivation of prop-
erty was de minimus, and no actual property was dispossessed. 8
Therefore, the court in Ruocco did not have to struggle with the
inexact due process guidelines of Mitchell.
The court in Garcia v. Krauss 9 compared the Texas seques-
tration statute to the sequestration statute in Mitchell and found
that the Texas statute did not provide the constitutional safe-
guards provided in the Louisiana statute. The Garcia court indi-
cated that the instant case would have been easily disposed of
13 According to the Court in Mitchell the fourteenth amendment rights of the debtor
are protected by the debtor's right to move for a hearing. The Louisiana statute requires
no specific time limit within which the motion must be heard, and in Mitchell the defen-
dant's motion was heard in 11 days. At the hearing, according to the Louisiana statute,
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove the grounds upon which the writ was issued.
14 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
'" 380 F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
" Id. at 432.
'" Id. at 437.
" See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. The Ruocco court admits that if realty
or personalty had been dispossessed, the outcome might have been different. 380 F. Supp.
at 437.
"1 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
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under Fuentes because no prior notice and hearing was required
by the Texas law. 1"0 However, in Mitchell, according to the Garcia
court, the Supreme Court overruled the requirement of prior no-
tice and a hearing and "balanced the interests of both parties in
their application of due process of law."' 0 ' The Garcia court found
that the Texas statute did not provide for judicial supervision of
the issuance of the writ, nor were adequate facts required to be
alleged in the petition, nor was there an immediate opportunity
for dissolution of the writ.' °2 Like the Ruocco court, the Garcia
court was not forced to define what the Court in Mitchell consid-
ered minimal due process. However, both Garcia and Ruocco
noted that the Fuentes requirement of prior notice and hearing
had been overruled and that in Mitchell the Court had balanced
the interests of the creditor and the debtor in applying due pro-
cess.
In Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Co.'03 a three-judge court did
define the constitutional limits of Mitchell and found the New
York attachment statute unconstitutional. The Sugar court's
analysis confined Mitchell narrowly to its facts. The court im-
plied that Mitchell presented minimum due process requirements
by stating that if a statute did not meet all the specific statutory
provisions upheld in Mitchell, it did not "squeeze through the
narrow door of constitutionality" of Mitchell and thus remained
"out in the unconstitutional territory charted in Fuentes.''04
Thus, unlike Garcia and Ruocco, the court in Sugar did not view
Fuentes as overruled but regarded Mitchell as insisting "on the
continued vitality of [the Fuentes] rule."'"5 The court acknowl-
edged that the New York law substantially paralleled the Louis-
iana statute upheld in Mitchell'06 except for what the court con-
sidered two significant differences. First, the post-seizure hear-
ing, although available, did not place the burden of proof upon
the plaintiff. Secondly, the attachment would be vacated only if
the attachment was "unnecessary to the security of the plain-
tiff,' '0°7 not when the grounds upon which the writ is issued were
" Id. at 1257.
Id.
o2 Id. at 1259.
103 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"3 Id. at 647.
'05 Id. at 650.




not proven. Additionally, the Sugar court limited the Mitchell
holding, indicating that Mitchell could not be applied to attach-
ment statutes because the plaintiff in Sugar had no creditor's
interest in the property attached such as Grant did in Mitchell.
°8
This confusion is not clarified by the Supreme Court's com-
ments on Mitchell, Fuentes, and Sniadach in North Georgia Fin-
ishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.0 In this case the Georgia garnish-
ment law allowed the garnishment of a corporation's bank ac-
count pending the outcome of a suit against it. The Court held
that Fuentes stood for the proposition that any significant taking
of property by the state, even if temporary, is within the purview
of the due process clause and there existed the right to a hearing
"of some sort.""' 0 This is the same account of Fuentes that was
given in Mitchell,"' and therefore, the conclusion that Mitchell
overruled the Fuentes requirement of prior notice and hearing is
consistent with North Georgia Finishing."' Thus, after holding
that Fuentes required a hearing "of some sort," the Court applied
the specific statutory procedures upheld in Mitchell fo the Geor-
gia statute. The Court found that the Georgia law required only
conclusory allegations in the affidavit, no participation by a judge
and no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would
be required to demonstrate probable cause." 3 Thus, in North
Georgia Finishing, Fuentes was applied to require a hearing "of
some sort" and Mitchell was applied to determine what specific
procedural safeguards will withstand a due process challenge. It
should be noted that the application of Mitchell is not limited
here, as it was by the court in Sugar, to a situation in which the
creditor has an interest in the property seized, nor to a specific
kind of property such as a consumer's household goods. However,
the extent to which statutes must parallel the requirements in
Mitchell is still unclear. As Justice Blackmun comments in his
dissent the "commercial statutes of all other States . . . are left
in questionable constitutional status, with little or no applicable
lOs Id. at 649.
109 95 S. Ct. 718 (1975). Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Mitchell and
North Georgia Finishing. Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan, who dissented in
Mitchell, voted with the majority in North Georgia Finishing. Justices Burger, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist, part of the majority in Mitchell, dissented in North Georgia Finishing.
1 95 S. Ct. at 722.
416 U.S. at 611.
" Justices Stewart and Powell in their concurring opinions indicate that they view
the majority opinion as "resuscitating" Fuentes.
"1 95 S. Ct. at 722-23.
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standard by which to measure and determine their validity under
the Fourteenth amendment.""'
CONCLUSION
In Mitchell the Supreme Court has reversed the trend of the
Fuentes line of cases which required notice and a hearing prior
to any deprivation of property. The majority's holding that a
hearing is required only before final deprivation of property is
supported by cases widely recognized as exceptions to the require-
ment of prior notice and a hearing, and cannot be used as valid
authority. The Court expands the rights of the creditor protected
by the fourteenth amendment. The result is that now the test of
due process requirements under the fourteenth amendment is a
procedural balancing of the interests of the creditor and the
debtor.
Yet, the Court in Mitchell leaves unclear the extent to which
the opinion is a retreat from the due process requirements of
Fuentes. Likewise, which statutory provisions will fulfill due pro-
cess requirements is uncertain. Cases have already inconsistently
interpreted the holdings of Mitchell, and to ensure uniformity
among the circuits the Supreme Court must clarify the ambigui-
ties surrounding prejudgment seizure of property under the four-
teenth amendment.
Mary M. Schwertz
Id. at 726.
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